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Accounting information quality has been said to play an important role in 
reducing information asymmetry. Thus, firms with high accounting information 
quality may enhance more investors’ decisions. This paper aims to empirically 
examine the association between accounting information quality and investment 
decisions among firms in Tunisia. The sample of this study consists of 50 firms 
listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange covering 2012 to 2016. The findings imply that 
accounting information quality is significantly negatively related to investment 
inefficiency. The inclusion of control variables and the use of alternative models 
to measure accounting information quality provide consistent findings. This paper 
has several important contributions. First, this paper provides new empirical 
evidence in an emerging market. Although emerging markets make up the vast 
majority of economic activity around the world, they have received limited atten-
tion in academic research. Second, this paper can also help researchers to better 
understand and realize the governance role of accounting information, and push 
them to investigate the other role of accounting information deeply and broadly.
Keywords: accounting information quality, investment inefficiency, agency costs, 
financial constraint, asymmetry
1. Introduction
Many researchers have explored that the major objective of accounting infor-
mation was to help its users make informed decisions. In addition, high-quality 
accounting information can also inform investors in a timely manner about the 
orientation of the firm’s capital investments and help them to supervise managerial 
activities. Similarly, Bushman and Smith [1] find that high-quality information 
disclosures are beneficial to investors by monitoring management, encouraging 
them to make investment decisions efficiently and effectively and finally improv-
ing capital allocation efficiency and gaining more returns to investors. Houcine, 
[2] argue that investors are concerned with the quality of accounting information 
because it helps them to better understand the company’s operating situation and 
other fundamentals. Therefore, high-quality accounting information affords exter-
nal stakeholders a comprehensive understanding of firm fundamentals and allows 
them to take action to supervise management behavior.
An investment decision basically consists of the process of accepting or reject-
ing a particular investment project. Thus, it can be noted that, from a theoretical 
point of view, the decision is simple: projects for which the return is greater than 
the opportunity cost must be accepted, while others must be rejected. In real life, 
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this process is not so easy, since the decision to accept or reject a project can be 
influenced by agents’ interests in the decision-making process. Thus, accepting 
economically unviable projects or rejecting economically attractive projects can 
occur when the outcome of such deliberations offers benefits to decision makers, 
even when it causes losses to shareholders [3].
Firms use accounting information in investment decision-making to whether 
invest in physical project or invest in capital market. Firms need to invest in effi-
cient investments with positive Net Present Value (NPV), and let go projects with 
negative NPV for better future growth and expansion. Accounting information is 
therefore important to facilitate informed decision [4].
This main objective of this study is to investigate the association of accounting 
information quality and investment decision using firm level observations in an 
emerging market such as Tunisia. The primary reason for choosing Tunisia is that 
we found an interesting research track in order to test the economic consequences 
of the quality of financial information in such an environment. Especially, in the 
face of this increasing doubt done over the quality of accounting results following 
the wave of financial scandals whereby Tunisia was not spared with BATAM case1. 
Also the Tunisian firms are characterized by a weak informational environment, 
namely a weak level of voluntary divulgation of information, little follow-up by 
financial analysts as well as quasi absence of media coverage by the economic and 
financial press, that turns the accountable information a component relatively more 
dominant among the set of information used by the different users of financial 
statements in their decision-making process [5].
The paper is organized into five sections including this introduction. Section 2 
presents a brief theoretical framework discussing the determinants of the quality 
of accounting information, and the relationship between accounting information 
quality, investment decision, and financial constraint. Section 3 explains the empir-
ical methodology, including the choice of variables and data issues. Estimation 
results are presented and discussed in Section 4 and we concluded in Section 5.
2.  The association between the quality of accounting information and 
the investment decision
One of the main objectives of accounting information is to provide information 
that can facilitate the efficient allocation of capital. In other words, quality of finan-
cial information should be one of the most important inputs in decision-making 
regarding capital allocation that is investments [6]. The Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) states that one objective of financial reporting is to help 
present and potential investors in making rational decisions for investment. Firm 
is seen as investing efficiently if it invested in projects with positive Net Present 
Value (NPV). If the firm passed up on investment opportunities that would have 
positive NPV, then the firm was under-investing. On the other hand, when firm 
invests in investments with negative NPV, the firm was over-investing. Under or 
over-investment indicate that the firm is not investing efficiently. Hence, the level 
of firm’s investment efficiency can be gauged from the absence of under or over-
investment [1].
Based on 3600 firm-year observations of A-share listed companies on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges from 2004 to 2006, Li [7] examines the 
1 It is a manipulation case of accounts that auditors, such as in the Enron case in the United States, did 
not report in time and that took on the emergence of a real financial scandal, affecting the credibility of 
the stock market as well as weakening seven local banks.
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influence of accounting information quality on the under- and over-investment of 
listed companies. His results show that high-quality accounting information reduces 
the risks of moral hazard and adverse selection and inhibits both under-investment 
and overinvestment by ameliorating contracts and supervision, thereby improving 
capital allocation efficiency at the company level.
2.1 Quality of financial information, capital cost and information asymmetry
The accounting The accounting information represents an important source of 
information specific to the company that tends to reduce the level of information 
asymmetry between investors and the company and therefore contributing to a 
better functioning of financial markets [8].
Under lower external financing costs and investor’s capital rationing, there 
is less possibility that managers pass up investments with positive NPV (lower 
under-investment). According to Jensen [9], lower adverse selection opportunity 
decreases the opportunity for managers to engage in value-destroying activities and 
self-maximizing decisions such as build an empire-building with ample capital (less 
over-investment).
Therefore, Easley and O’Hara [10] show that poor quality of accounting informa-
tion leads to an undiversifiable information risk between informed and uninformed 
investors, thus increasing the cost of capital. On the other hand, the publication of 
better financial information in terms of quality and quantity would reduce this level 
of risk and therefore the cost of capital. Similarly, Yee [11] asserts that poor quality of 
the published information is considered to be a non-diversifiable risk factor leading 
to an increase in the risk premium, a component of the cost of capital. Also, Lambert 
[12] demonstrate how better quality of information accounting disclosure consents 
to reduce systematic risk by changing the perceptions of different stakeholders in 
the financial market regarding the distribution of future cash flows, and as a result, 
attenuating the cost of capital. For his part, Suijs [13] illustrates that better quality of 
financial information reduces the cost of capital by lowering the volatility of securi-
ties by improving risk sharing between generations of investors.
As well, in the light of literature developed above and empirical works, if a 
better quality of accounting information published, namely in terms of reliability, 
enables to reduce the levels of information asymmetry, and so the capital cost, it 
will be associated with a better decision of investment, facilitating the access to 
external funding sources for companies with a less cost, and consequently to reduce 
under-investment. Such an association was documented as well over the emerging 
developed markets, from which, we suggest testing the following hypothesis:
H1: A better quality of published accounting information is negatively 
associated with under-investment.
2.2 Quality of financial information, agency costs and control of managers
According to previous studies from the perspective of agency theory, the main 
reason for financial information is to alleviate the problem of information asym-
metry by increasing shareholders, creditors, and others access to information about 
a company.
As the access to the accounting information increases, the privileged position 
held by managers in relation to private information decreases [9]. Based on this 
assertion, the accounting information is currently used as an input within contracts 
of inciting remuneration in order to motivate the managers to act in the interest of 
stakeholders and constitute an important source of information on which gover-
nance organs are based on controlling managerial activities [1, 2].
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For instance, several past studies find that accounting information is used by 
shareholders to monitor managers [1, 12] and it is an important source for investors 
in monitoring firms’ performances [4, 14]. Therefore, if higher financial informa-
tion quality improved investors and shareholders ability to monitor managerial 
activities and detect their dysfunctional behavior such as over and under-invest-
ment, it could lead to managers investing more efficiently.
Based on the above theoretical arguments, we tend to check the hypoth-
esis below:
H2: A better quality of published accounting information is negatively 
associated with over-investment.
3. Research methodology
3.1 Sample and data collection
In order to test our hypotheses in the Tunisian context, we select a sample of 50 
companies listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange (TSE). This number is limited 
because we have eliminated the financial companies due to their specific financial 
data. This study is based on observations from 2012 to 2016. The data are collected 
from the publications of the sample companies (annual reports, prospectuses…) 
available at the Financial Market Council, among some brokers or some companies’ 
websites and on the publications of the TSE.
Table 1 provides distribution of the sample by industry based on the 
DataStream-industry classification. The sample is represented by 12 industries.
3.2 Investment decisions
First, we tested the association between the investment decisions and the quality 
of accounting information conditional on the assumption that the company is in a 
situation more prone to over or underinvestment. Similar with past studies [6, 15], 
Industry N Percentage (%)
Construction and materials 7 14%
Electronic and electrical equipment 3 6%
Food producers 2 4%
Telecommunication 5 1%
Electronic and electrical equipment 6 12%
Oil equipment and services 3 6%
Health care equipment 2 4%
Industrial metals and mining 4 8%
Industrial transportation 5 1%
Software and computer services 6 12%
Support services 4 8%
Technology hardware 3 6%
Total 50 100%
Table 1. 
Sample distribution by industries.
5
Accounting Information Quality and Investment Decisions
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.93980
both overinvestment (positive deviations from expected investment) and underin-
vestment (negative deviations from expected investment) are considered inefficient 
investments. Specially, we use the model that predicts investment as a function of 
revenue growth. The model is described as follow:
 + + + += β + εi,t 1 , i,t ,Invest RevGrowthi t 1 i t 1  (1)
Where:
Investi,t + 1 = total investment expenditure for year t + 1, which relate to fixed 
capital investment and are measured by the difference between the gross values of 
fixed assets of t + 1 and t, deflated by the capital stock at the start of the period.
RevGrowthi,t = revenue growth and defined as percentage change in revenue 
from year t – 1 to t.
εi, t: the residuals of the model, which represent the inefficiency of the 
investment.
Then, we will then use the residuals of model (1) as a specific proxy for the level 
of deviation of the company from its expected level of investment. The negative 
(positive) residuals from the regression model (1) indicate under investment (over 
investment). In our analyses, we use the absolute value of residuals as a proxy for 
investment efficiency.
Thus, based on the residual of the model, we could identify differences and 
make the necessary groupings, as shown in Figure 1.
3.3 Accounting information quality
There is no universally accepted measure of accounting information quality 
[6, 16]. But no number could be as attractive to users of financial statements as the 
accounting result [16]. According to Francis et al. [17], the quality of accounting 
results has several attributes, namely reliability, relevance, conservatism, punctual-
ity, smoothing, predictability and persistence. At the level of this research, we will 
in particular be interested in two attributes of the accounting result, namely: the 
quality of accruals and accounting conservatism. Our choice focused on these two 
attributes since it has been widely demonstrated by the various previous works 
[6, 15, 18, 19] that it is mainly these two attributes of the accounting result which 
improve the investment behavior of companies. Practically, a better quality of 
accruals increases the accuracy and reliability of accounting results, lowering the 
cost of capital and thus reducing underinvestment. On the other hand, a more 
conservative accounting result, allocates to governance bodies to exercise better 
Figure 1. 
Grouping of firms according to efficiency in investment decisions.
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control over managerial decisions, and therefore to reduce ex-ante their incentive 
and ability to undertake unprofitable investments.
3.3.1 Measure of the quality of accruals
Managers can use their discretion to manipulate results via accruals and to alter 
the actual performance of the business. This is why the results, which quickly turn 
into cash flow, represent the most desirable quality of profits. Francis et al. [17], 
consider that this rapid transformation of results into cash flow, is at best captured 
by the model of Dechow and Dichev [20]. The DD model (2002) suggests that 
the quality of accruals is assessed by the degree of association between the change 
in total current accruals with cash flows from past, present and future periods. 
However, we will use the modified DD model (2002) as proposed by McNichols [21] 
to determine discretionary accruals. This model states that beyond cash flows, the 
change in net sales and the proportion of tangible fixed assets are variables impor-
tant in forecasting with respect to currents accruals:
i, 0 1 i,t 1 2 i,t 3 i,t 1 4 5 i,t i,tCUACC  ß  ß CFO  ß CFO  ß CFO  ß ASi,t  ß Asset  .− += + + + + + + εt
Where:
CUACCi,t: the amount of current accruals of firm i for year t, calculated as 
follows: ∆ CAit - ∆ CLit - ∆ LIQit +∆ DEBit.
Where:
∆ CAit: change in current assets between t - 1 and t;
∆ CLit: change in current liabilities;
∆ LIQit: change in liquidity t - 1 and t;
∆ DEBit: change in current debts between t - 1 and t;
CFOi,t-1, CFOi,t and CFOi,t + 1: cash flow from operations for the years t-1, t 
and t + 1,
ASi,t: change in annual sales between t-1 and t;
Asseti,t: the proportion of tangible fixed assets in year t.
In this model, the absolute value of the residuals is used as a proxy the quality of 
accruals (QACC). We will multiply this value by (−1), so that a higher value cor-
responds to a better quality of the accruals, and therefore, of the accounting results. 
The quality of accounting information is therefore assumed to be inversely propor-
tional to the company’s propensity to manage the accounting result.
3.3.2 Measure of accounting conservatism
At the level of the current research, we are going be interested in an attribute of 
accounting result, namely accounting conservatism. In fact, a more conservative 
accounting result, allocates to governance organs to exert a better control on the 
managerial decisions, and thus to reduce ex-ante their incentives and their qualifi-
cations in order to undertake non-profitable investments. Yet, we will specifically be 
interested in conditional conservatism. According to Gively, and Haynes [22], there 
are two types of conservatism: conditional and unconditional. Unconditional con-
servatism results in under-evaluation of the accounting value of net assets since the 
start of the economic activity of the company, because of the selection beforehand, 
of accounting conservatism methods. While under-evaluation of assets led by the 
conditional conservatism is attributable to the delay of accountability between 
latent losses and gains. As we prepare to show that through asymmetric recognition 
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of gains and losses, this form of conservatism endorses a role of control on the 
activities of managers, namely those that are reattached to the investment decision. 
We will use the accumulation of non-current accruals, in view of apprehending the 
degree of conservatism for every company-year.
The current measure was initially developed by Givoly and Haynes [22] and then 
repeated by several authors [19, 23]. These latter argue that the underlying intuition 
behind resorting to this measure lies in the fact that it captures caution and vigi-
lance such as the trends of accountants to require more auditing so as to recognize 
the good news in terms of financial statements and manage to anticipate bad news. 
In fact, non-current accruals comprise accounting posts subject to the applica-
tion of the precaution principle, such as: provisions, change effects at the level of 
accounting estimation methods, losses on asset disposals, impairment of assets, etc.
Though these rubrics must be mandated by the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles, both the schedule and size of these loads/expenses, are left to the discre-
tion of the managers, which makes them largely subject to their discretion and 
therefore constitutes a measure of accounting conservatism [24].
Non-current accruals NCUACC are measured by the difference between total 
accruals (net outcome– operating cash flow) as well as current accruals.
We will estimate the size of NCUACC over a period of 3 years, ranging from t-2 
to t. To better facilitate the interpretation, we will multiply this value by (−1). Thus, 
positive values are synonymous with conservative accounting practices.
3.4 The control variables
Consistent with past studies such as Verdi [3], Biddle et al. [15] and Chen et al. 
[6] following control variables are applied for this study:
MTBi,t = we retain the Market ratio to book as the first measure of growth 
opportunities. It was measured by Denis [25] via the rapport between the market 
value and the accounting value of proper capitals (Market to book ratio).
XCEi,t = done by Biddle et al. [15] we will include the sales growth as an addi-
tional measure of growth opportunities. It was measured by the variation of the 
company turnover between the year t and t-1.
SIZEi,t = logarithm of the total accounting asset. The firm size equally represents 
an explicative factor of investment expenditure, since it can have an impact on the 
access to external capitals.
DEBTi,t = ratio total debt divided by the total asset. With reference to Myers [26] 
the financial shift can lead to under-investment caused by the over-indebtedness 
problem.
3.5 Model specification
To test our hypothesis on whether accounting information quality in year t 
affects investment decisions in year t + 1, we estimate a model that connects inef-
ficiency of investment with the various measures of the quality of accounting 
information and a set of control variables. We will estimate a logistic regression in 
order to take counts the binary nature of our dependent variable, which predicts the 
likelihood that a firm will belong to one of the two groups.
This specification considers simultaneously, but separately, the probability of on 
and under-investment. The model to be tested is as follows:
 i,t 1 0 1 i,t j i,t i,t 1InvestIneff ACCOUNQUA CONTR+ += β +β + ∑β + ε  (2)
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Where,
InvestIneffi,t + 1: Inefficiency of investment represents over or under-investment 
which is a binary variable that takes the value of 1(0) if the residuals of the model 
(1) are positive (negative), 0(1) otherwise.
ACCOUNQUAi,t: the measurement of the quality of financial information, as 
described below.
CONTRi,t: different control variables, as defined previously.
4. Analysis of results
4.1 Descriptive analysis
Table 2 shows that Tunisian companies have a poor quality of their account-
ing results compared to other countries. Indeed, the average of their accruals is 
around (−0.0322), this level is lower than that detected by Francis et al. [18] in 
the American context (−0.0442). At the same time, it appears from Table 1 that 
Tunisian companies exhibit an average level NCUACC of (0.008), revealing that 
they practice low conservative accounting compared to the average value (0.01) 
detected by Xu et al. [19] on the Chinese market.
4.2 Multivariate analysis
Before moving to multivariate analysis, it is first important to evaluate the 
multicollinearity by using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), and the results show 
that VIF values are also relatively small and there is no multicollinerity issue among 
variables (Table 3).
Table 4 presents the multivariate results in panels testing the relationship 
between the quality of the accounting result and the probability of under and 
overinvestment. The Logit model applied to panel data can be estimated using a 
fixed or random effect. If the estimation of fixed effects is adopted, the constant is 
treated as an unobservable characteristic specific to firm i in correlation with the 
other variables in the model.
Since the dependent variable is binary and the specific effect must be elimi-
nated, only companies that have changed status from one period to another are 
taken into account in the estimate, which implies the exclusion of observations 
which have not changed over time [22].
On the other hand, if the estimate adopted follows a random effect, the constant 
is considered as a non-observable random variable and not correlated with the other 
variables, which allows it to be integrated into the model [27]. So for these reasons, 
Variable Average Gap Type Minimum Maximum
QACC −0.032 0.352 −0,511 2.987
CONSV 0.008 0.073 −0.244 −1.205
MTB 1.886 2.217 −0.431 14.566
XCE 0.4178 0.755 −3.236 1.490
SIZE 16.566 0.998 16.258 22.314
DEBT 0.722 4.534 0.033 0.927
Table 2. 
Descriptive statistics of variables.
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we opted to adopt the random effect model so as not to exclude observations that 
do not vary over time. Before interpreting our results, it is important to note that 
the prediction quality of our models is very strong (90%) and this, for the different 
specifications selected. The models also have very good overall significance, insofar 
as the likelihood ratio test (LR test) is significant at the 1% level.
It is possible to note in Table 4 that the quality of the accruals increases the 
probability of underinvestment, while it has no significant impact on the prob-
ability of overinvestment. Our results can, however, be explained by the contextual 
specificities of the Tunisian market as well as the behavior of the Tunisian investor. 
Thus, we can first argue that the low quality of financial information displayed on 
average by Tunisian companies may explain our results.
In fact, according to the descriptive statistics, Tunisian firms display on aver-
age a lower quality of their accruals in comparison to American or Chinese firms. 
A priori, this level of quality does not seem sufficient enough in the eyes of the 
Tunisian investor, to constitute a means making it possible to attenuate the levels 
of asymmetry of information with regard to the firm, to reduce its cost of capital. 
Then, we can invoke the behavioral dimension of the Tunisian investor in the 
explanation of our results. Indeed, the latter may not have enough confidence in the 
accuracy of the financial information conveyed through the accounting results, so 
that it cannot reduce the levels of information asymmetry towards the firm. On the 
contrary, for the Tunisian investor, publicly disclosed financial information would 
increase the levels of information asymmetry, since the latter does not consider such 
information as a reliable source of information and would have more confidence in 
information collected on its own and through private channels. In fact, Loukil and 
Yousfi, (2012) [28] recently noted that the Tunisian investor has no confidence in 
the public information disclosed by companies and would have more confidence in 
private information. The authors specifically found that only private information 
reduces the levels of information asymmetry on the Tunisian stock market. As for 
accounting conservatism, it remains to have no effect on the probability of over and 
under investment. Such a result is contradictory to that found by Xu et al., (2012) 
[19] on the Chinese market, but can be explained by the low conservative account-
ing practiced by Tunisian companies in comparison to Chinese companies.
Furthermore, the results tell us that neither the quality of the accruals nor the 
accounting conservatism have a significant effect on overinvestment decisions. 
We can explain our results by the fact that the low level of accruals displayed on 
average by Tunisian firms, does not allocate to financial information to take on a 
governance role, to reduce the agency costs associated with the control of managers 
and to improve the selection process investment projects. In other words, the role of 
governance granted to accounting conservatism is conditioned by a set of control 









Tolerance values and VIF without bias.
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With regard to control variables, the results show that the MTB, Cash-Flow and 
liquid assets ratios increase (decrease) the probability of overinvestment (underin-
vestment). While the size of the firm decreases (increases) this probability. As for 
the debt ratio, this variable persists in having no significant effect on the probability 
of over and under investment. These different results are similar to those found by 
Biddle et al. [19].
5. Conclusion
This study focuses on the importance of the quality of accounting information 
quality on the investors’ decisions making. Indeed, prior studies state that better 
financial information, contributes to making better investment decisions, as it 
reduces the level of information asymmetry. This finding can be explained by the 
fact that high-quality financial information facilitates the process of monitoring 
managers because, by reducing existing asymmetries, it inhibits opportunistic 
behavior, ensuring the rights of both shareholders and creditors. We are extending 
this current of research to the context of emerging market, particularly Tunisia, 
because of the importance of its challenges for businesses. In order to test our 
hypotheses, we have used two attributes of the quality of accounting results, 
namely: conditional conservatism and the quality of accruals.
The results of this study indicate that the quality of the accruals increases the 
likelihood of underinvestment. We attribute such a result to the lack of confidence 
that the Tunisian investor places in the accounting information vehicled through the 
UNDINVEST OVERINVET

















































Log likelihood −55.881 −53.635 −57.019 −54.361
LR test 25.73*** 23.43*** 23.37*** 21.03***
Quality of Prediction 91.42% 90.24% 89.68% 91.45%
Specific Effect Random Random Random Random
*Coefficient significatif à 10%.
**Coefficient significatif à 5%.
***Coefficient significatif à 1%.
Table 4. 
Results of the estimation of the relationship between the quality of accounting results and the probability of 
under-investment and over-investment.
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accounting results. On the other hand, the results reveal that the quality of accruals 
has no effect in reducing the probability of overinvestment. The low level of accru-
als displayed on average by Tunisian firms could explain such a result.
Furthermore, we reveal that accounting conservatism has no significant effect 
and therefore cannot constitute a lever for action in improving the investment 
decisions of Tunisian companies. We can explain these results by the fact that the 
Tunisian firms practice a weak conservative accounting so that this level is not suf-
ficient to allow this attribute of the result to assume an informational role allowing 
to attenuate the problems of asymmetry of information present between the firm 
and its capital providers.
Our findings suggest that countries, especially emerging markets, can benefit 
from improved financial information quality. Hence, these countries should take 
initiative to improve their market infrastructures such as adopting better account-
ing standards and encourage greater disclosure as well as enhancing the role of 
enforcement agencies. In addition to this, these findings could be of interest to the 
international organizations such as “World Bank” and “International Monetary 
Fund”, whose missions are to aid countries with developing and transitional econ-
omy, and improve living conditions of their citizens. It is likely that more efficient 
investments will lead to better allocation of capital and resources and this may lead 
to higher social welfare. One limitation of this paper is that the relationship between 
accounting information quality and capital investment choice may differ with the 
different development stage of the industry. Maybe this issue is an important topic 
for future research.
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Notes
1. There are two types of conservatism: Conditional and unconditional. Uncon-
ditional results in under-evaluation of the accounting value of net assets since 
the start of the economic activity of the company, because of the selection 
beforehand, of accounting conservatism methods (Givoly et al.; 2007). While 
under-evaluation of assets led by the conditional conservatism is attributable 
regarding the delay of accountability between latent losses and gains.
2. QACC = measure of the quality of accruals, as estimated according to the 
model of Dechow and Dichev (2002); CONSV = measure of conservatism by 
means of non-current Accruals; MTB = market to book ratio (market value of 
equity compared to accounting value); XCE = Rate of sales growth of year t,  
measured by the variation of the firm’s turnover between the year t and t-1; 
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SIZE = logarithm of the total accounting assets of the firm; DEBT = total debts 
reported to the accounting value of the total asset.
3. The Table 3 presents the results of estimates of panel logistic regression with 
random effects. The dependent variable is based on the unexplained level of 
investment. UNDINSVT = Firms classified among those which underinvest; 
OVERINVST.
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